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protected enclaves for citizen interaction, overlapping
authoritative institutions that can be appealed to and be
mobilized, and citizen empowerment to effect real politi-
cal change. These arrangements are themselves provi-
sional, she claims, as she presents them as “likely candidates”
for increasing political agency rather than abstract pana-
ceas to be promoted in all contexts.
Provisional Politics, then, occupies a difficult position,
rejecting both the ideal pursuit of abstract principles and
the potentially paternalistic drive to come up with spe-
cific solutions to actual dilemmas. The project rejects the
overwhelming ambitions of so much political theory in
which the social contract, class consciousness, or a cos-
mopolitan ethics offer the solution to the world’s prob-
lems. As a result, the book offers some concrete proposals
that are, in a word, underwhelming: “[P]roperty rights
have no conclusive authority” but they are “often provi-
sionally useful” (p. 54); voting rights should be allocated
differently across different contexts depending on what
allocation will “promote the conditions of political agency
and plurality” in any particular time or place (p. 112).
But indeed, the point is precisely that the overwhelming
alternatives operate at a level of abstraction that cannot
but prove antidemocratic.
In this sense, her argument for Kantian provisionality is
of a piece with George Klosko’s work on Plato (which she
discusses) and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s work
on Marx (which she does not). More generally, it is con-
sistent with the turn toward “contingency” or “irony” in
political thought of the past few decades. Indeed, her basic
argument for provisionality in democratic theory (Chap-
ter 2) will be unsurprising to those familiar with Sheldon
Wolin’s claim that democratic decision making is always
“partial and provisional.” But in the closing pages of the
book, Ellis even invokes Thomas Jefferson’s warning about
letting a constitution bind future generations as an exam-
ple of provisional politics. This reflects her belief, stated
much earlier in the book, that though provisionality has
animated various strains of political thought, it has been
largely absent from the history of social contract theory
(pp. 15, 20).
The book comprises a series of exercises in provisional
theorizing, beginning from the pathological position of
entrenched political controversies and considering what
policies might promote greater political agency and plu-
rality. Ellis notes that some of these exercises are more
encouraging than others; provisional theory offers clear
benefits to the understandings of public reason (Chap-
ter 2) and voting (Chapter 4), but is more ambivalent in
the case of property rights among Kenyan widows (Chap-
ter 3), and positively discouraging to a campaign for spe-
cies preservation in Southern California (Chapter 5). The
cases prove more difficult as they get more specific. But
Ellis sticks to her provisional guns, demonstrating the dif-
ficulty of maintaining a commitment to democratic poli-
tics above any particular outcome. Ellis admits that she is
far less optimistic than Kant himself, describing a series of
provisionally useful interventions instead of, as she sees in
Kant, an “asymptotic” progression toward peace. Notably,
of course, her “muted pessimism” is anything but fatalism;
in rejecting teleology, she envisions persistent, rather than
episodic, opportunities for political engagement.
Provisional theory makes its strongest case in the chap-
ter on deliberative democracy, where Ellis posits a virtu-
ous cycle of democratic participation in which each
opportunity for meaningful political engagement ends pro-
visionally and thus serves as an invitation to more engage-
ment. This cycle, however, meets its polar opposite in the
final substantive chapter focusing on environmental poli-
tics, where Ellis describes a “ratchet effect” (p. 116) result-
ing from the specific dynamics of species extinction.
Because any decision to protect a species is always subject
to reversal, whereas every decision to let a species go extinct
is necessarily irreversible, Ellis admits that endorsing pro-
visional rather than conclusive policies in the environmen-
tal realm “amounts to a preemptive, substantive decision
against species preservation” (p. 144), and that “species
extinction on a large scale is the overwhelmingly likely
outcome” (p. 146). Even in the face of this bleak realiza-
tion, however, Ellis proves reluctant to abandon provision-
alism for a “paternalistic” embrace of substantive outcomes,
surely because such paternalism carries its own frighten-
ing ratchet effect.
Provisional politics is not merely inconclusive; it endeav-
ors to reconcile morality and politics by offering judg-
ments that are declarative, open about their groundings,
and admittedly fallible. Provisionalism is not a refusal to
take a stand (or a denial of the ultimately contentious
grounds of one’s stand), but a willingness to take a stand
that invites, rather than seeks to forestall, disagreement.
By the end of the book, Ellis has replaced Kant’s edict “Let
justice reign, even if the world should perish” with her
own: “Let there be provisional right, so that the possibility
of politics in the world remains” (p. 158). Ellis makes no
guarantees, and no promise of redemption. But then, what
democrat would?
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Michael Allen Gillespie tackles a perennial topic in the
history of ideas—the emergence of the “modern” world-
view and its relation to the theology of the premodern
past—with originality and insight. The sweep of his book
is particularly ambitious and impressive. Gillespie man-
ages the difficult task of balancing more than a dozen
sharply drawn intellectual portraits of major Western think-
ers, while at the same time fitting each of these individual
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puzzle pieces together into a complex and persuasive meta-
narrative about the origins of our modern values.
Previous scholarly explorations of this ground, Gillespie
notes, have tended to gravitate between characterizing
modernity either as a radical break with the Christian past
and the rise of a fundamentally new mode of life and
inquiry (G. F. W. Hegel, Jacob Burckhardt, Hans Blumen-
berg), or as a more gradual and continuous transforma-
tion that transposed Christian ideas to a secular context
(Etienne Gilson, Karl Lowith, Johan Huizinga). However,
as Gillespie argues, these approaches have all tended to
assume the internal coherence of the theology of ancient
and medieval Christendom itself, and to infer that moder-
nity must therefore constitute a response to this theology,
either by extending or secularizing it, on the one hand, or
by breaking with and thoroughly transfiguring it, on the
other.
Instead, Gillespie’s book contends that the true origins
of modernity are to be found within a tension (or perhaps
incoherence) present within orthodox Christianity itself.
Christianity’s continuation of the radical monotheism of
Judaism led it to adopt an ontological realism regarding
universals, inspired by its broad universal claims regarding
God’s omnipotence and omnibenevolence. However, the
particularist character of Christianity’s account of revela-
tion, especially in its biblical foundations and in the doc-
trine of the Incarnation, contrarily committed it to a more
nominalist and individualist ontological foundation. This
conflict recurs again and again within Christianity’s his-
tory, emerging both in its philosophical troubles (theod-
icy) and its political conflicts (the Reformation). But
Gillespie stresses that modernity as we know it also took
shape within the constraints of this enduring metaphysi-
cal dilemma, and for this reason, even though the explicit
theological reasoning has now largely dropped out of sight,
a deep theoretical conflict still remains at its heart. These
tensions within Christianity will be familiar to theolo-
gians and philosophers of religion, but Gillespie’s inge-
nious contribution is to spot the many ways in which this
tension reappears within modern culture itself.
The core of the author’s argument can be found in his
first chapter: that the origins of modernity can be traced
back to the nominalist revolution in medieval philosophy
and theology, and that, indeed, the germ of the idea of the
modern is already implicit in the controversy to which
nominalism gave rise. Ockham, the quintessential nomi-
nalist thinker, held that ontological realism about univer-
sals, though perhaps initially inspired by claims about God’s
monotheistic omnipotence, in fact constrained God’s
omnipotence by making God dependent on forces inde-
pendent of God’s own being and will. In place of this
ontological realism, Ockham promoted a radical orienta-
tion toward particulars and individualism that led to an
increased awareness of contingency and a sharper focus on
the will as opposed to reason. It led as well to a more
thoroughly voluntaristic understanding of God’s interven-
tion in and judgment of the world.
In the centuries immediately following Ockham,
Gillespie goes on to argue, the theological conflict exposed
by nominalism began to work its way out into the broader
culture, first through Renaissance humanism, from Petrarch
to Machiavelli and Erasmus, and then through the Refor-
mation thought of Martin Luther and his Protestant suc-
cessors. Although the humanists rejected the logical
squabbles of nominalism as much as those of scholasti-
cism, they nevertheless derived from the nominalists their
distinctive concern with particularity and individualism—
but at the expense of a full affirmation of God’s omnipo-
tence. Luther and the Reformers, in turn, seeking to head
off the perceived Pelagianism of humanist individualism,
took the nominalist notion in a different direction: a vol-
untarist reaffirmation of God’s omnipotence, bought at
the price of undercutting free will and human dignity.
Modernity, on Gillespie’s account, arose in response to
this set of imperatives and tensions hidden within the
nominalist mode of inquiry. By refocusing our attention
on questions of becoming and motion, rather than being
and universals, nominalism gave rise to an understanding
of the relation of God and nature that made possible mod-
ern natural science. But its most lasting expressions emerged
with Descartes and Hobbes, whom Gillespie pairs as rival
fathers of competing versions of modernity: for Descartes,
a rationalist modernity, for Hobbes a materialist one.
Descartes’s rationalism, the foundation of the continental
philosophical tradition, solved the enduring conflict by
elevating the subjective will of both the nominalist and
humanist traditions above the particular limitations of the
bodily and finite world. By contrast, Hobbes’s material-
ism, which underwrites much of subsequent Anglo-
American philosophy, employed a neonominalism that
emphasized the contingency of nature and of humanity’s
place within nature, but also stressed humanity’s potential
to shape and constrain this contingency through instru-
mental reason and convention.
In the book’s final chapter and epilogue, Gillespie begins
to draw some more explicit connections between the story
he has been telling and the enduring contemporary phil-
osophical problems that he claims are rooted in the direc-
tion taken by modernity. The insights he begins to develop
here are good ones (his brief reflections on the relation of
contemporary Islam to these theological problems are
particularly provocative), and less historically inclined read-
ers might wish for some further and more explicit unpack-
ing of these connections. But for readers willing to work
out certain aspects of the story’s connections to contem-
porary thought on their own, or for readers for whom a
genealogy of Western moral and political concepts is an
end in itself, Gillespie’s impressive book will constitute
an important contribution to the macrolevel interpreta-
tion of the history of moral and political ideas.
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